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I.  Introduction
Providing incentives to managers of publicly owned companies is the classic example of
the principal-agent problem (Berle and Means (1932)).  Managers or executives take unobserved
actions that affect the returns of shareholders.  The literature on principal-agent theory suggests
that the primary means for the shareholders to ensure that managers take optimal actions is to tie
managers' pay to the performance of their firms; that is, to provide high-powered incentives for
managers to maximize the returns to shareholders.
1  Managerial compensation will be correlated
with the total return to shareholders, typically through ownership of the firm's stock or options
on the firm's stock.
Despite the compelling logic of the principal-agent framework, there is little existing
empirical support for the model when applied to executive compensation. In their recent survey
of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 774) ask, “Given the large impact of
executives’ actions on values of firms, why aren’t very high powered incentive contracts used
more often in the United States and elsewhere in the world? Is their use limited by optimal
design of incentives, by fear of self-dealing, or by distributive politics?”
The evidence that managers are not given high-powered incentives is provided by the
seminal article of Jensen and Murphy (1990a).  They find that the compensation of chief
executive officers increases by only $3.25 per $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth, which they
interpret as being too small to provide significant incentives.  They hypothesize that political
forces work to reduce the pay-performance sensitivity from what would be consistent with the
principal-agent model.  Hall and Liebman (1997) estimate larger pay-performance sensitivities
and document that the pay-performance sensitivity has grown since 1980 due to increasing
ownership of stock and stock options.  However, they do not conclude based on their findings
that compensation contracts are efficient and, therefore, draw no inferences about the validity of
the principal-agent model.
These studies are unable to support the principal-agent model because the average level
of the pay-performance sensitivity cannot be used to judge the validity of the principal-agent
model.  Haubrich (1994) shows through numerical simulations that some parameterizations of
the principal-agent model allow for pay-performance sensitivities as low as the 0.003 found by
                                                       
1 There are other mechanisms that may induce managers to act in the best interests of the shareholders, such as
reputational concerns, competitive labor markets, and the threat of takeover, dismissal, or bankruptcy.2
Jensen and Murphy (1990a). A more direct test of the model focuses on its comparative static
predictions.
2 The standard principal-agent model posits an economic tradeoff between inducing
the correct amount of unobservable effort by the agent and minimizing the amount of risk she is
required to bear.  In most principal-agent models, the pay-performance sensitivity will be
decreasing in the riskiness or variance of the firm's performance.  Executives in firms with more
volatile stock prices will have less performance-based compensation.
We use the variation in stock return volatility across firms to test whether executives at
riskier firms have lower pay-performance sensitivities. We find that the pay-performance
sensitivity of a manager's compensation is decreasing in the variance of her firm's returns. In
general, the pay-performance sensitivity for executives at firms with the least volatile stock
prices is an order of magnitude greater than the pay-performance sensitivity for executives at
firms with the most volatile stock prices. These findings strongly support the principal-agent
model.
We also find that estimates of the pay-performance sensitivity that do not explicitly
account for the variance of firm performance are biased toward zero.  The variance of firm
performance is an extremely important determinant of compensation, as implied by the principal-
agent model.  Consider two firms, one with a high variance of returns and the other with a low
variance of returns.  Suppose that the CEOs of both firms receive the same compensation
because the high variance firm had good performance and the low variance firm had poor
performance.  Running a regression of pay on performance, or simulating pay-performance
sensitivities, without controlling for the variance of firm performance will incorrectly find no
pay-performance sensitivity, since the CEO with better performance does not receive higher
compensation.  We find that omitting the variance of firm performance dramatically understates
the average pay-performance sensitivity.
Another prediction of the principal-agent model is that executive compensation should be
based not only on the returns to the firm's shareholders but on every variable that provides
unique information about the action taken by the manager.
3  A prominent example of such a
variable is the returns of other firms in the same industry, leading to a compensation contract
based on the relative performance of the manager compared to her industry rivals. The prediction
                                                       
2 This point has previously been made by Garen (1994).  We discuss his empirical findings below.
3 This is the sufficient statistic result from Holmström's (1979, 1982) work on moral hazard.3
from the relative performance evaluation model is that, other things equal, an executive will
receive lower compensation if executives of rival firms deliver higher returns to their
shareholders.
The empirical literature on relative performance evaluation finds mixed results. Jensen
and Murphy (1990a) find that relative performance is not an important source of managerial
incentives. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Antle and Smith (1986) test more directly for
relative performance pay and find that, holding constant the rate of return on a firm's common
stock, a higher value-weighted industry rate of return lowers the growth of CEO pay. In contrast,
Barro and Barro (1990) and Joh (1996) find that compensation increases with industry
performance using data on banks and Japanese firms, respectively.  Janakiraman, Lambert, and
Larcker (1992) find that compensation increases with industry performance using accounting
data and decreases with industry performance using stock return data. In Aggarwal and Samwick
(1997), we find some evidence of relative performance evaluation in short-term compensation
but find that long-term compensation increases with industry performance.  In that paper, we
argue that strategic interactions between managers at rival firms in an industry will limit the use
of relative performance evaluation.
As in the case of the standard principal-agent model without relative performance
evaluation, examining the average levels of the own-firm and industry pay-performance
sensitivities provides only a weak test of the relative performance evaluation model. A stronger
test would examine the comparative static predictions of the relative performance evaluation
model. One such prediction is that executives in industries with low variance or in firms with
high covariance between industry and firm returns should be subject to more relative
performance evaluation than executives in industries with high variance or in firms with low
covariance between industry and firm returns.  If relative performance evaluation across firms in
an industry is an important source of managerial incentives, then when precise industry signals
are available or when covariance with the industry is high, industry performance will have a
significant negative effect on executives' compensation.
We find little evidence to support the relative performance evaluation model. When the
measure of firm performance is stock returns, we show in the Holmström-Milgrom (1987) model
that a sufficient index for the degree of relative performance evaluation is a firm's stock beta
(measured relative to its industry’s return rather than the market return). The degree of relative4
performance evaluation should, in theory, be increasing in the firm's stock beta. This hypothesis
is not supported by the data when firm performance is measured either as percent returns or
dollar returns to shareholders. In addition, we find that other implications of the relative
performance evaluation model have, at best, limited support.  For example, the industry pay-
performance sensitivity is not typically estimated to be negative and significant.
We are aware of three previous studies that have performed analyses similar to ours:
Garen (1994), Lambert and Larcker (1987), and Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992).
Garen (1994) empirically examines both the principal-agent model and the relative performance
evaluation model.  He tests the principal-agent model by examining whether CEOs’ stock-related
compensation is decreasing in the standard deviation of firm returns and whether CEOs’ salary-
based compensation is increasing in the standard deviation of firm returns. He finds weak
evidence in support of this proposition.  In none of his regressions is the coefficient on the
standard deviation of firm returns statistically significant. He also finds little evidence of relative
performance evaluation in firms with higher stock betas. He argues that pay in the form of salary
should increase with a firm's beta while the use of stock and stock options should decrease with a
firm's beta. He finds that both decrease in the firm's beta. As these results are ambiguous, we
clarify the relationship between relative performance evaluation and a firm's stock beta in
Section IV.
Lambert and Larcker (1987) test a principal-agent model of executive compensation in
which there are two signals of managerial effort: accounting returns and stock market returns.
Using salary and bonus as their measure of pay, they find weak evidence that the pay-
performance sensitivity is influenced by the variances of the return measures.  In later work,
Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992) use time series tests to argue that there is no relative
performance evaluation in accounting returns and weak evidence of relative performance
evaluation in stock returns. In particular, they test a strong restriction on the data implied by a
relative performance evaluation model--that any common component to shocks to firm and
industry performance is completely removed by the compensation contract. This restriction is
rejected--common components to shocks are not completely removed. We conduct a similar test
of the relative performance evaluation model and find even less support in the data.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the data used and the
methodology we employ. We use data on executive compensation from Standard and Poor's5
ExecuComp dataset and stock return data from CRSP.  Our sample consists of comprehensive
data from the largest 1500 publicly traded companies in the United States from 1993 to 1996 and
represents the largest cross-section of executives ever used to examine compensation.  The data
include the top five executives at each firm for each year.  Unlike the previous literature, our
results have implications for more than just CEOs.
In Section III, we present the results testing the principal-agent model. We find strong
empirical support for the model. This is true for both CEOs and other highly compensated
executives.  We estimate the model for firm performance specified as dollar returns and
percentage returns.  We also estimate the model for compensation specified as the annual change
in value of firm-specific wealth (i.e., including gains on existing holdings of stock and stock
options), total annual compensation from the firm, and the change in annual compensation.  For
several specifications, we find that firms with the highest variance give their managers
essentially no pay-performance sensitivity while those with the lowest variance give their
managers substantial pay-performance sensitivity.
In Section IV, we test the relative performance evaluation model. We find little support
for relative performance evaluation of CEOs or other executives.  We find little support
regardless of how returns are specified, of the econometric technique employed, and of the
measure of compensation used.  We also briefly discuss why relative performance evaluation
might not be a prominent feature of executive compensation contracts.  Section V concludes.
II. Data
In this section, we describe the data that we use to test the principal-agent and relative
performance evaluation models.  We use the ExecuComp dataset distributed by Standard and
Poor's as a supplement to its Compustat dataset to construct our measures of executive
compensation. We use stock returns from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) to
calculate our measures of the variance of firm performance and its covariance with industry
returns.
The ExecuComp data set contains data on total compensation for the top five executives
(ranked annually by salary and bonus) at each of the firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400,
and S&P SmallCap 600.  Due to enhanced federal reporting requirements for fiscal years ending6
after December 15, 1992, the ExecuComp data for 1993 through 1996 are virtually complete.
4
The two main advantages of ExecuComp relative to other data that have been used to examine
executive compensation are that it contains a very wide cross-section of firms and that it contains
data not only for chief executive officers (CEOs) but for other executives as well.
Table 1a presents summary statistics for the five measures of compensation that we
analyze in our empirical work.  These statistics are for the 1995 sample year and are
denominated in thousands of dollars.
5  The first three rows of the table are our measures of "flow
compensation," or the resources that the shareholders of the firm paid directly to the executive
instead of keeping for themselves.  Flow compensation is comprised of both short- and long-term
components.  Short-term compensation includes salary, bonus, and other annual payments such
as gross-ups for tax liabilities, perquisites, and preferential discounts on stock purchases.  Long-
term compensation includes payouts from long-term incentive plans, the value of restricted stock
granted, the value of stock options granted, and all other compensation such as contributions to
benefit plans and severance payments.
The first row shows that flow compensation averaged $2.3 million for CEOs and
$939,000 for other executives.  The right skewness of the data is evident in the medians being
about 40 percent lower at $1.4 million and $565,000, as well as in the maximums of $65.6
million and $34.7 million.  The presence of outliers such as these motivates our use of median
regressions below.  The second row shows the dollar change in flow compensation for all
executives who did not switch companies between 1994 and 1995.  CEOs received an average
raise of $182,000, compared to $69,000 for other executives.  The third row reports the change in
the logarithm of flow compensation, which corresponds approximately to the percent change in
flow compensation.  CEOs received an average raise of 6.2 percent, compared to 7.3 percent for
other executives.  The two measures of the change in flow compensation are less skewed than
the level, showing substantial movements in both positive and negative directions.
As is well known, flow compensation is not the major source of incentives provided to
top management.  ExecuComp also includes data on the executives' holdings of stock in their
                                                       
4 See Standard and Poor's (1995) for documentation of the ExecuComp dataset.  Our analysis in this paper uses the
October 1997 release of the data.
5 The samples used for these tabulations include only those executives at firms for which we had sufficient historical
data (four years) to calculate reliable measures of stock price variance in the CRSP data set.  About 200 of the firms
in the sample failed to meet this criterion.  Differences in the number of observations for different measures of
compensation are the result of either an executive switching firms between 1994 and 1995 (in which case the change7
own companies and existing options on their companies' stock.  The fourth row of the table adds
to flow compensation the change in the market value of the executives' holdings of stock and
stock options in their companies (as of the beginning of the year).  This measure of
compensation is denoted as the "Change in Firm-Specific Wealth."  For CEOs, the change in
firm-specific wealth was $24.2 million at the mean and $3.1 million at the median.  The
minimum was a loss of $114.4 million and the maximum was a $5.6 billion gain.  For other
executives, the mean of $4.2 million and median of $1.1 million are closer together, but the
extremes of a $117.8 million loss and a $1.1 billion gain are similar to those for CEOs.
A drawback to ExecuComp is that the value of existing options is only reported for
options that are currently "in-the-money."  This implies that if a firm's stock price falls below the
option's exercise price--even if this is just a small change in price--then the option is not reported
on the balance sheets.  A similar problem may occur for small increases in the stock price that
put an option back in the money. This reporting convention will overstate a measure of the
sensitivity of compensation to firm performance. An opposite problem will occur for price
movements in either direction for out-of-the-money options that remain out-of-the-money.  Since
most options have been held for several years and were issued at the money, the net effect of
these biases may not be too severe.  Nonetheless, we also conduct our estimation with a measure
of the change in firm-specific wealth excluding existing options.  This measure is shown in the
fifth row of the table.  The mean and median changes in "Wealth Excluding Existing Options"
for CEOs are $21.1 million and $2.0 million, respectively.  For other executives, the mean and
median are $3.1 million and $753,000.  The extremes of the distribution are unaffected, however.
Table 1b provides further evidence on the size of executives' investments in their own
firms.  The first row shows that 97.96 percent of CEOs and 93.61 percent of other executives
own stock in their companies.  The mean and median holdings, conditional on ownership, are
$65.4 million and $4.6 million for CEOs and $8.1 million and $648,000 for other executives.
The maximum holdings are $16.6 billion and $2.7 billion for CEOs and other executives,
respectively.  When evaluated as ownership shares of the firm, the average CEO holds 2.98
percent of her firm and the average Non-CEO holds 0.44 percent.  Median holdings are about
one-tenth as large, and maximum shares are 63.23 percent and 43.38 percent for CEOs and other
executives, respectively.  The third row reports ownership of existing options.  Slightly more
                                                                                                                                                                                  
in compensation does not pertain to the same firm in both years) or missing data on a component of compensation.8
than 80 percent of both CEOs and other executives have options, with conditional means of $7.3
and $2.2 million, respectively.  Maximum values are much lower than for stock ownership,
reaching only $317.9 and $127.3 million for the two groups.  Finally, the bottom row shows that
68.9 percent of CEOs and 72.4 percent of other executives received a new option grant in 1995.
The average values were $1.2 million for CEOs and $393,000 for other executives, representing
sizable components of total flow compensation.
6
Studies of executive compensation are typically based on CEOs at large publicly traded
firms.  As noted above, the firms in the ExecuComp sample represent the largest 1500 publicly
traded corporations in the United States.  In 1995, the total assets per firm were $7.9 billion at
the mean and $1.3 billion at the median.  The median firm had 5,860 employees and the mean
firm had 18,450.  Sales per firm averaged $3.7 billion, with a median of $1.1 billion.  Net income
was $54.3 million for the median firm and $219.4 million at the mean.  The Jensen and Murphy
(1990b) sample consists of CEOs at the largest 430 publicly traded companies in 1988.  The Hall
and Liebman (1997) sample consists of CEOs at 478 companies.  By comparison, our sample
consists of three times as many firms and has data on five times as many executives per firm.
Our tests of the principal-agent and relative performance evaluation models exploit the
cross-sectional variation in the pay-performance sensitivity.  We allow the estimated pay-
performance sensitivity to vary with the firm's stock return volatility.  We construct the variables
to implement these tests from two sources.
ExecuComp provides data on the total return to shareholders in each sample year,
specified in percent returns. We subtract the growth in the Consumer Price Index to examine real
returns.  Dollar returns to shareholders are equal to the percent returns multiplied by the market
value of the firm at the beginning of the sample year, which is also reported in ExecuComp.  The
first two columns of Table 1c present the deciles of the distribution of both of these measures of
performance over all sample years.  Percent returns range from a loss of 97.38 percent to a gain
of 475.71 percent, with a median return of 9.91 percent and a mean return of 14.72 percent.
Dollar returns have a low of -$18.755 billion and a high of $60.990 billion.  The median dollar
return is $61 million and the mean dollar return is $483 million.  As we discuss in Section IV, we
also compute the returns to shareholders for each firm's industry using the ExecuComp data set.
                                                       
6 The value of stock options granted is estimated using the Black-Scholes formula, as documented in Standard and
Poor's (1995).9
In order to compute variances and covariances of stock returns, we need data at a
monthly frequency.  Since Compustat reports data at quarterly or annual frequencies, we use data
from CRSP to compute each company's stock return variance and covariance with industry
returns.  Our estimates are based on the monthly total returns to shareholders over the sixty
months preceding the sample year.  For example, to compute the return variance for a firm in
1993, we use the variance of monthly returns from January, 1988, to December, 1992.  As in the
ExecuComp data, we use real returns, including dividends and other distributions.
Our tests of the principal-agent model require only the variance of the returns to the
executive's firm.  The cross-sectional distribution of the standard deviation of percent returns is
presented in the third column of the table.  The standard deviations range from a low of 2.73
percent to a high of 32.06 percent, with mean and median standard deviations of returns of 8.82
and 8.07 percent, respectively.  Our tests of the relative performance evaluation model require
the variance of the idiosyncratic returns to the executive's firm and the beta of the firm's total
returns with the industry returns.
7  The standard deviations of the idiosyncratic returns are about
a percentage point smaller than the standard deviations of the firm's returns throughout the
distribution.  Fewer than 10 percent of the betas measured relative to the industry are negative.
The maximum beta is 3.36.  The mean and median betas are both very close to 1, taking on
values of 0.989 and 0.965, respectively.
III.  The Principal-Agent Results
In this section we test comparative static predictions of a standard principal-agent model.
In Holmström-Milgrom (1987), firm performance is given by p = x + e where e ~ N[0, se
2] and x
is the manager’s action choice.  The manager’s compensation contract is given by w = a0 + a1 p.
The optimal performance-related component of the contract, the pay-performance sensitivity, for











2 is the variance on the measure of performance, r is the manager’s coefficient of
                                                       
7 As discussed in Section IV, the idiosyncratic return is the portion of the firm's return that is uncorrelated with the
industry's return.  Its variance is se
2(1-r
2), where r is the correlation of the firm's return with the industry return and
se
2 is the variance of the firm's return.  The firm's beta measured relative to the industry is r se/ sq, where sq is the
standard deviation of the industry return.10
absolute risk aversion, and k is the curvature of the agent’s disutility of effort function.  For our
purposes, the important feature of this expression is that the manager’s pay-performance
sensitivity, a1, is clearly decreasing in se
2.  This result is the key comparative static prediction
that we test. We will specify firm performance as both dollar returns to shareholders and
percentage returns to shareholders.
In this principal-agent setting, what matters for the executive’s compensation is the
variance of the performance measure and not the covariance of the performance measure with
any other variable such as the market return.  Covariance is only important in a relative
performance evaluation setting, which we examine in the next section.  Intuitively, covariance
would matter in this setting only if the executive held a well-diversified portfolio.  If the
executive held a well-diversified portfolio, then the executive would maximize the value of her
portfolio and not her compensation, as is assumed in the principal-agent literature.  Restrictions
on stock and stock option grants ensure that executives do not hold well-diversified portfolios,
that they are in fact heavily invested in the stock of their own firms.  Executives will therefore
care about the variance of their own firms’ stock, and variance is the appropriate variable to use
in testing the principal-agent model.
In estimating the pay-performance sensitivity, we approximate the optimal contract for
executive i working at firm j in year t with the following linear specification:
(2)
In this specification, wijt is the executive's compensation, pjt is the return to shareholders
(specified as either dollar or percentage returns), li is an executive fixed effect, mt is a year
effect, and eit is the error term.  F(sjt
2) is the cumulative distribution function of the variance of
returns for firms in the sample. By using the CDF, the estimated values of g1 and g2 can be easily
transformed into pay-performance sensitivities at any percentile of the distribution of variances.
The pay-performance sensitivity for a manager with a given firm stock return variance is g1 +
F(sjt
2)g2.  For example, a firm with the median stock return variance has a pay-performance
sensitivity of g1+0.5g2.  CDF values of 0 and 1 correspond to the minimum and maximum
observed variances in the sample, where the pay-performance sensitivities are g1 and g1+g2,
respectively.
The principal-agent model predicts that higher returns to shareholders will lead to higher
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compensation (g1 > 0) and that the effect of higher returns will be smaller at firms with more
variable stock prices (g2 < 0).  The test of the model is based on the sensitivity of compensation
to performance, not on the level of compensation itself.  The principal-agent model does not give
an unambiguous prediction as to whether the expected level of compensation is increasing with
firm stock return variance.  This implies that the model cannot be tested based on the sign of g3.
However, by including the CDF of return variance in the regression, we ensure that our estimates
of g2 are not affected by any relationship between variance and the level of compensation that
may happen to exist in the cross-section.  The equation also includes year effects (mt) to allow for
different average levels of compensation in each sample year.
To demonstrate the robustness of our empirical results, we estimate equation (2) in
several different ways.  To be consistent with Jensen and Murphy (1990a), we specify returns to
shareholders as the dollar change in the market value of the firm over the year.  This is the
percentage return to shareholders (of capital gains plus dividends) multiplied by the market value
of the firm at the beginning of the year.  With compensation in thousands and market value in
millions of constant 1995 dollars, the estimated pay-performance sensitivity of g1 + F(sjt
2)g2 is
denominated in dollars of compensation for each thousand dollar increase in firm value.  Note
that in this regression, sjt
2 is the variance in the dollar returns to shareholders, so that we account
for the fact that larger firms will tend to have larger variances by virtue of scale.
In other specifications, we specify returns as the percentage returns to shareholders.  The
pay-performance sensitivity is therefore thousands of dollars of compensation for each
percentage point increase in returns to shareholders.  Although it is commonplace in the
literature to estimate dollars of compensation on percent returns to shareholders, this
specification assumes that the extra compensation that the executive would receive for a one
percent increase in the value of the firm is independent of the size of the firm.  In a cross-section
of firms, this assumption is likely to be false.  We estimate this specification for consistency with
the previous literature.  However, we consider the specification of dollars of compensation on
dollar returns to shareholders to be the appropriate one to test the principal-agent model.
Tables 1a and 1b showed clearly the presence of outliers in the data on compensation. As
a measure of the center of a distribution, the median is more robust to the presence of large
outliers than is the mean.  We therefore use median regressions to estimate pay-performance
sensitivities.   We will compare our estimates to those in the previous literature (Jensen and12
Murphy (1990a) and Hall and Liebman (1997)) in which pay-performance sensitivities were
computed for CEOs with median stock ownership.
We also estimate pay-performance sensitivities using ordinary least squares, which
corresponds to calculating pay-performance sensitivities at the mean stock ownership.  In the
OLS regressions, we are able to include fixed effects for each executive (li) in the equation when
we estimate pay-performance sensitivities.  The fixed effects control for all differences in the
average level of compensation across executives in the sample.  Only the variations in an
executive's pay and her firm's performance relative to their averages over the sample period are
used to identify the pay-performance sensitivity.  It is extremely important to note that the
inclusion of executive fixed effects also controls for any other aspect of the executive or firm that
may affect executive compensation, such as the well documented cross-sectional relationship
between firm size and its executives' compensation.
Tables 2 and 3 present the median regression results. Median regression minimizes the
sum of absolute deviations rather than the sum of squared deviations.
8 Given the right skewness
of the compensation data, the estimated pay-performance sensitivities will be smaller for the
median than for the mean.  Additionally, since the median is a more robust measure of the center
of the data than the mean, the precision of the estimates will also increase. These specifications
do not include executive fixed effects.  The standard errors are calculated according to the
bootstrap procedure in Gould (1992) with twenty replications.
In Table 2, the dependent variable is specified as the change in firm-specific wealth, with
and without existing options.  The top panel measures performance as the dollar return to
shareholders, and the bottom panel uses percentage returns to shareholders.  The left two
columns estimate the equation for all executives identified as CEOs, and the right two columns
estimate the equation for all other executives.
The coefficient on performance in the top panel in the first column shows that for a CEO
of a firm with the least variance of stock returns in the sample (i.e., F(sjt
2) = 0), firm-specific
wealth increases $27.60 for every thousand dollar increase in the market value of the firm.  The
coefficient on the interaction of performance and the CDF of return variance shows that for
                                                       
8 See Koenker and Bassett (1982).  As discussed in Buchinsky (1998), the precise value of the dependent variable in
a median regression matters only in determining whether the observation has a positive or negative residual.  If the
residual is positive (negative), then the dependent variable could increase toward infinity (negative infinity) without
affecting the estimated parameters.13
executives at firms with more return variance, the pay-performance sensitivity declines
substantially.  At the maximum variance in the sample (i.e., F(sjt
2) = 1), the pay-performance
sensitivity is 27.60 - 26.15 = $1.45 for every thousand dollar increase in market value.  At the
median variance, the pay-performance sensitivity is $14.52 per thousand and is statistically
significant.  Two features of these results provide strong support for the principal-agent model.
First, the coefficient on the interaction of variance and performance, g2, is negative and
statistically significant.  Second, the pay-performance sensitivity at the lowest variance is an
order of magnitude greater than the pay-performance sensitivity at the highest variance, showing
that the differences in incentives are economically large.
As discussed in Section II, the reporting convention for the value of existing options may
exacerbate their sensitivity to firm performance.  The next column reports the analogous
estimates when the measure of compensation excludes the change in the value of existing
options.  The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant.  The
ratio of the pay-performance sensitivities at the minimum and maximum variance is about the
same as for the change in firm-specific wealth.  The median pay-performance sensitivity falls by
55 percent to $6.59 per thousand dollars.  Because it excludes all incentives from existing
options (and over 80 percent of the executives in our sample hold options), this estimate
represents a lower bound for the sensitivity of the change in CEO wealth to firm performance.
The next two columns in the top panel of Table 2 present the estimates for executives
who are not identified as the CEO of their firm.  As in the case of CEOs, the coefficients on the
interactions of performance and variance in the dollar returns regressions are all negative and
comparable in magnitude to the coefficients on performance.  Because the sample size is over
three times larger than for CEOs, the coefficients are even more statistically significant. At the
median variance, estimated pay-performance sensitivities are about one-fifth the size of those for
CEOs.  The pay-performance sensitivities at the minimum variance are an order of magnitude
greater than the pay-performance sensitivities at the maximum variance.  These results show that
the principal-agent model is an appropriate characterization of the compensation of other top
executives as well as CEOs.
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows that the same basic pattern emerges when
performance is measured in percentage returns, but the results are weaker.  For CEOs, the
estimate on the interaction is negative, though insignificant and small in magnitude. At the14
median variance, a CEO receives $129,164 for every percentage point increase in total returns to
shareholders.  Given the mean and median market values of $2.9 billion and $852 million in
1995, this estimate corresponds to pay-performance sensitivities of $4.45 and $15.16 per
thousand when measured in dollar returns.
9  The number for the median firm is comparable to
the estimate of $14.52 per thousand in the top panel of the table. For other executives, the
coefficients on the interactions are negative and statistically significant.
Our median estimates of the pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs in the top panel of
Table 2, $6.59 to $14.52 per thousand, are substantially larger than previous estimates in the
literature, such as the $3.25 per thousand estimated by Jensen and Murphy (1990a).  The
discrepancy exists because previous estimates do not explicitly control for the variance of firm
performance.  In effect, they impose the restriction that g2 = 0.  To understand why this
restriction leads to lower estimates, note that the median share ownership of CEOs reported in
Table 1b is about 0.3 percent of their firm.  It may seem as if a 0.3 percent share ownership
implies that the pay-performance sensitivity would be $3.00 per thousand.  However, the $3.00
per thousand is correct only if the value of holdings in a CEO's own firm is uncorrelated with the
variance of firm performance.  In fact, CEOs of less risky firms have larger holdings in their own
firms.  In 1995, for example, the median share of the firm owned by CEOs in firms with less than
the median variance was five times as large as the median share owned by CEOs at firms with
more than the median variance.
10
We have also estimated the regressions excluding the terms pertaining to the variance of
returns (i.e., imposing the restriction that g2 = g3 = 0).  In those regressions (not reported), the
coefficient on firm performance falls from $14.52 to $3.47 per thousand.  The dramatic reduction
in the estimate results from forcing the interaction of variance and performance, g2F(sjt
2)pjt, into
the error term rather than including it as an independent variable.  Because g2 is actually negative
rather than zero, the omitted variable is strongly negatively correlated with the included measure
of performance.
As an example, consider the effect of adding two firms to the sample, one with high
variance (and therefore low pay-performance sensitivities) and the other with low variance (and
therefore high pay-performance sensitivities).  Suppose that the CEOs of both firms receive the
                                                       
9 These estimates are calculated as 4.45 = 129.164/ (0.01*2900) and 15.16 = 129.164/ (0.01*852).
10 The comparison is similar for other executives, with those with less than the median variance having three times15
same compensation because the high variance firm had good performance and the low variance
firm had poor performance.  The effect of adding these two observations to a regression that does
not control for variance is to lower the estimated pay-performance sensitivity, since the CEO
with better performance did not receive higher compensation.  In the regression model that we
estimate, these observations do not lower the pay-performance sensitivity conditioned on the
variance of firm performance.  The negative coefficient on the interaction of variance and
performance implies that the CEO at the higher variance firm receives the same compensation
only if she delivers higher performance.  The similarity in compensation is appropriately ascribed
to the differences in the interaction of variance and performance, allowing for a positive effect of
performance alone.  As a result, the actual pay-performance sensitivity is higher than its estimate
in the regression that does not control for variance.  This finding suggests that if the principal-
agent model is the appropriate framework for executive compensation, estimates that ignore the
effect of variance on the pay-performance sensitivity will be biased toward zero.
The large pay-performance sensitivities in Table 2 are primarily the result of incentives
provided by the executives’ ownership of stock and stock options.  Table 3 presents the
analogous calculations for the flow measures of compensation discussed in Section II.  Recall
that these measures of compensation are unrelated to the executives’ existing stock and option
holdings. The pay-performance sensitivities at the median variance show that flow compensation
accounts for about 5 percent of the overall estimates in Table 2 for CEOs and 6 percent for other
executives.  The coefficient on the interaction of performance and variance is negative in each
specification.  Only one of the twelve estimates is not statistically significant at the one percent
level.
In all regressions using flow compensation, the pay-performance sensitivity is
significantly positive at the median variance, and in several cases, the sensitivity at the maximum
variance is insignificantly different from zero.  The gap between CEOs and other executives is
much narrower in flow compensation, with CEOs having pay-performance sensitivities about 3
times those of other executives at the median variance in the level and change in flow
compensation.  Although the pay-performance sensitivities are much smaller, the results in Table
3 show that the decrease in the pay-performance sensitivity with the variance of returns is not
just a direct consequence of the distribution of stock and option ownership.  The incentives
                                                                                                                                                                                  
larger median share ownership than those with more than the median variance.16
provided by flow compensation are also in accordance with the principal-agent model. As an
indication of the magnitude of the pay-performance sensitivities, the value of 0.0003 for the
percent change in flow compensation for CEOs at the median variance implies that a billion
dollar increase in the firm's market value increases a CEO's flow compensation by 30 percent. At
the minimum variance, the CEO's flow compensation would increase by 60 percent.
We also estimate equation (2) using ordinary least squares to demonstrate the robustness
of our results. The results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. As noted above, in the OLS regressions
we are able to include an executive fixed effect. In all cases, heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are reported beneath the estimated coefficients and pay-performance sensitivities. For the
sample of other executives, the standard errors are also calculated to be robust to possible
correlations in the errors for different executives within a given firm in each sample year.
The top panel of Table 4 shows that when returns are specified in dollars, the strong
confirmation of the principal-agent model in Table 2 is also evident in OLS regressions.  The
coefficients on the interaction of performance and variance are negative and statistically
significant, and the pay-performance sensitivities are an order of magnitude larger at the
minimum variance than at the maximum variance.  At the median variance, the estimated pay-
performance sensitivities are substantially larger than their values from the median regressions.
The difference is larger for CEOs than for other executives, which is consistent with the presence
of more outliers among CEOs than other executives.  CEOs are estimated to have mean pay-
performance sensitivities of $69.41 per thousand, compared to $8.74 per thousand for other
executives.
The results for returns specified in percentages in the bottom panel of Table 4 are
consistent with the principal-agent model but less statistically significant.  As in the median
regressions, the coefficients on the interaction of performance and variance for CEOs are
negative but not statistically significant. The results for other executives are strongly supportive
of the principal-agent model. For the total change in firm-specific wealth, CEOs receive
$562,480 per percentage point and other executives receive $99,316 for each percentage point of
returns to shareholders at the median variance.  For the change excluding existing options, CEOs
receive $490,677 and other executives receive $68,106 per percentage point of return at the
median variance.
Table 5 reports the OLS regression results for the flow measures of compensation.  In all17
cases, the coefficients on the interaction of performance and variance are negative.  In all but
four cases, they are highly statistically significant and, in all but one case, close to the magnitude
of the corresponding coefficient on performance.  Compared to the median regressions in Table
3, the magnitudes of the pay-performance sensitivity at the median variance are lower for flow
compensation, higher for the change in flow compensation, and roughly the same for the
percentage change in flow compensation.
We have also estimated the regressions in Tables 2 through 5 using measures of risk
other than the CDF of variance.  The negative sign and statistical significance of the interaction
of performance and risk are robust to the measure of risk used.  For example, when we use the
variance instead of the CDF of variance as our measure of risk, the coefficients (standard errors)
on the performance and interaction terms are 4.344 (0.271) and -0.257 (0.085), respectively, for
the median regressions of "Change in Firm-Specific Wealth" for CEOs using dollar returns.
Although the coefficient on the interaction term is again negative and significant, the point
estimates for the pay-performance sensitivities are unreliable.  The coefficient on performance
shows that the pay-performance sensitivity for the minimum variance firm will be about 4.344,
which is much lower than even our median estimate of 14.523 in Table 2.  The reason for the
disparity is that the variance of returns is a skewed variable, giving disproportionate influence in
the regression to observations from high variance firms with low pay-performance sensitivities.
To demonstrate this point and to show the robustness of our specification of risk, we also
estimated a spline regression based on the quintiles of the distribution of variance.  Sorting the
firms into quintiles by variance is a more general way of controlling for variance in our
estimation. This procedure is equivalent to regressing pay on performance separately for each of
the five quintiles.  We look directly at the coefficients on performance to determine whether the
pay-performance sensitivities differ across the five quintiles.  Using the "Change in Firm-
Specific Wealth" for CEOs, dollar returns, and median regressions, the pay-performance
sensitivities (standard errors) from the lowest to highest variance quintiles are: 30.545 (2.834),
21.161 (2.227), 14.765 (1.382), 8.289 (0.913), 2.365 (0.123).  The pay-performance sensitivities
are clearly declining as variance increases, and the estimate for the middle quintile of 14.765 is
very close to our median estimate of 14.523 from Table 2.
11
                                                       
11 While the assumption that the pay-performance sensitivity is linear in the CDF does not affect the point estimate
in the median regressions, it has more impact in the OLS regressions.  The OLS spline point estimate of the pay-
performance sensitivity for CEOs in the middle quintile is 40.838 (10.050), compared to the estimate of 69.410 at18
 Overall, Tables 2 through 5 provide support for the standard principal-agent model, in
which pay-performance sensitivities decrease with the variance in the measure of firm
performance.  There have been two other tests of this prediction in the literature, Garen (1994)
and Lambert and Larcker (1987).  Garen (1994) regresses the firm-specific estimated pay-
performance sensitivities of CEOs from Jensen and Murphy (1990b) on a measure of the
standard deviation of the excess (percent) return of the firm's stock.  The sample period in the
Jensen and Murphy (1990b) study was 1974 - 1988.  When the standard deviation of returns is
not interacted with the log of the firm's assets, Garen (1994) estimates that its coefficient is
positive and insignificant.  When the standard deviation is interacted with this measure of firm
size, its coefficient is estimated to be negative and insignificant.  The latter specification is
analogous to the first column in the top panel of our Table 2, in which we find that the
coefficient on the interaction of performance and variance is negative and highly statistically
significant.
Apart from the difference in the sample time periods covered, there are two important
differences between his econometric specifications and ours.  First, our sample includes
approximately three times as many CEOs in each annual cross-section.  Second, our
specification allows for changes in the variance of performance over time to help identify the
coefficient on the interaction term.  This yields a total of 4507 separate observations of
compensation, performance, and variance in our sample of CEOs.  Garen's sample is restricted to
only 415 observations (i.e., the single cross-section) because the variance of performance was
not included in the regression that estimated Jensen and Murphy's (1990b) firm-specific pay-
performance sensitivities.  It is therefore not surprising that our estimates of the effect of the
variance in performance on the pay-performance sensitivity are more consistently negative and
are statistically significant.
Lambert and Larcker (1987) use a model in which there are two signals of managerial
effort: accounting returns and stock market returns.  Using only salary and bonus as their
measure of pay, they find weak evidence that the pay-performance sensitivity is influenced by
the variance of the return measures. In particular, they find evidence that the pay-performance
sensitivity depends on the relative precision of the two measures only when they include
observations that have positive weights on both measures of performance (thereby eliminating
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the median variance from Table 4.19
222 of their 370 sample firms). In their full sample, the results are insignificant.
Our point estimates of the pay-performance sensitivity can also be compared to the recent
findings of Hall and Liebman (1997), who estimate the distribution of pay-performance
sensitivities for a sample of 478 CEOs at large publicly traded corporations.  For dollar returns,
Hall and Liebman (1997) estimate median and mean values of $5.29 and $25 per thousand in
1994 based on their Table VI.  We estimate pay-performance sensitivities of $14.52 and $69.41
(or $6.59 and $58.61 excluding options) over the 1993 to 1996 sample period in the top panels of
our Tables 2 and 4. Apart from differences in samples, the major distinction between their
specification and ours is that their estimates do not account for the impact of risk on the pay-
performance sensitivity.  In regressions (not reported) in which we omit the variance terms, the
estimated pay-performance sensitivities fall to $3.47 and $12.26 per thousand for the median and
mean, respectively.
12  Failing to account for the variance of the distribution from which a firm's
stock return is realized generates a substantial bias toward zero.  It is worth reiterating, however,
that the validity of the principal-agent model is better judged by the comparative static
relationship between variance and the pay-performance sensitivity than the average level of the
pay-performance sensitivity itself.
IV.  The Relative Performance Evaluation Results
In this section, we extend the analysis to consider the relative performance evaluation
model.  Suppose, following Holmström and Milgrom (1987), that in addition to firm
performance, contracts can be written on another variable that is correlated with the noise
component of firm performance. This variable is assumed to be uninformative about the
executive’s action.  An example would be the performance of other firms in the industry or in the
market as a whole under the assumption that the actions of one executive do not affect the
performance of other firms in her industry.
13  Random shocks to firm performance are likely to
be correlated across firms.  This correlation can be used to decrease the risk faced by an
executive and improve her contract.  Denote this additional random variable or signal as q, where
q ~ N[0, sq
2] and has a correlation coefficient of r with e. The manager’s compensation contract
is given by w = a0 + a1p + a2q.  The optimal performance related components of the contract for
                                                       
12 The dependent variable in these regressions is the "Change in Firm-Specific Wealth."
13 In Aggarwal and Samwick (1997), we argue that this assumption is likely to be false due to strategic interactions20























Relative performance evaluation occurs in the sense that the performance of the rest of the
industry is used to reduce the variance of the firm shock in the optimal contract.  The optimal
contract puts a negative weight, a2, on industry performance.
14  Defining se
2(1-r
2) to be the
variance of the idiosyncratic shock to the firm's performance, one comparative static prediction
of the model is that the weight on own-firm performance (a1) is decreasing in the idiosyncratic
variance of firm returns.  Further, the ratio of the weight on industry performance to the weight
on own-firm performance (a2/a1) is negative and decreasing in the correlation of firm and
industry returns, decreasing in the variance of firm returns, and increasing in the variance of
industry returns.
There is one additional point to be made about these contracts when the additional
variable ￿ is industry or market returns.  If these returns are specified as percentage returns, then
the weight on industry performance in the optimal contract is:










2 - = - = .
b is the firm's stock beta from the CAPM measured relative to either the industry or the market,
depending on the benchmark used.  The ratio of the weight on industry performance to own-firm
performance, a2/a1, is equal to -b.  Thus, beta will be a sufficient index for the amount of
relative performance evaluation that occurs in the Holmström-Milgrom model.  Firms with high
covariance with their industry or firms in industries with little variance will do more relative
performance evaluation.  Note, however, that beta itself does not directly affect a1.
There is some confusion about the role of beta in relative performance evaluation in the
literature.  Garen (1994) argues that firms with high betas should give less performance-based
compensation (i.e., lower a1).  This will only be true if, holding constant the correlation
coefficient and industry variance, beta is high because firm variance is high.  However, if beta is
                                                                                                                                                                                  
among managers at rival firms.
14 We assume throughout that the correlation, r, is positive, as is true in the data.  The generalization to negative21
high because the correlation between firm and industry returns is high, holding constant firm and
industry variance, then high betas could yield more performance-based compensation (i.e.,
higher a1).  Therefore, tests based on whether a higher beta reduces performance-based
compensation are inconclusive with respect to the relative performance evaluation model. Garen
(1994) also argues that salary-based compensation should increase with beta, by the same logic.
However, salary-based compensation could either decrease or increase with beta without
implying anything about the relative performance evaluation model.  Garen (1994) finds that
both salary-based compensation and stock- or performance-based compensation decrease with a
firm’s beta.  These findings do not reject a relative performance evaluation model, nor do they
provide any degree of confirmation.
Instead, we directly test the following restriction implied by the relative performance
evaluation model:








We test two versions of this restriction. The first is that this derivative is literally equal to -1.
This test corresponds exactly to the strong-form test of the relative performance evaluation
model in Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992).  The second test is simply that the
derivative is negative, which is clearly a much weaker restriction.  It allows for the possibility
that there may be other factors that determine the relative weights on own and industry
performance that are unrelated to the effort-insurance tradeoff.
In order to test the relationship between pay and relative performance, we modify our
existing specification in two ways. The first is that the own-firm pay-performance sensitivity
(a1) depends on se
2(1-r
2), the variance of the idiosyncratic shock to the firm's performance.  We
construct the empirical CDF of the idiosyncratic variance and denote its value for firm j in year t
by Gjt.  The second modification is that the regression must include terms for the industry pay-
performance sensitivity, a2.  Since the theoretical result is that a2 = - a1bjt, four variables are
needed to capture the effect of industry performance.  The first variable is industry performance
itself, qjt. The second is industry performance interacted with the CDF of idiosyncratic variance,
Gjtqjt, because a1 varies with idiosyncratic variance. The third is industry performance interacted
with beta, bjtqjt. The fourth is industry performance interacted with both beta and idiosyncratic
                                                                                                                                                                                  
correlations is straightforward.22
variance, Gjtbjtqjt.  These last two variables are included because the relationship between bjt and
a1 is multiplicative.  The econometric specification that we estimate is:
(6)
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The own and industry pay-performance sensitivities for an executive at firm j are
therefore:
(7)
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For simplicity, we suppress the firm and executive subscripts on the pay-performance
sensitivities.  The remaining variables in the regression--Gjt, bjt, and Gjtbjt--are included to
control for any differences in the level of compensation in the cross-section that may be due to
variance, beta, or their interaction.  As in the tests of the principal-agent model in Section II, the
specification includes year effects (mt) in both median and OLS regressions and executive fixed
effects (li) in the OLS regressions.
The two tests of the relative performance evaluation model are Wald tests based on:
(8) ( ) .
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The first null hypothesis (H1) is that this derivative is equal to zero.  We view this test as the key
test of relative performance evaluation because it is a comparative static prediction that does not
imply a terribly strong restriction on the data. Any tendency to filter out the common component
of shocks will reject the null hypothesis in favor of the relative performance evaluation model.
The second null hypothesis (H2) is that the derivative is equal to negative one, as implied by the
relative performance evaluation model. If relative performance evaluation is but one of several
factors that determine the weight on industry performance, then this null could be rejected even
if there were some use of relative performance evaluation.
Industry performance (qjt) can be defined as narrowly as the 4-digit SIC level or as
broadly as the market as a whole.  We have done the analysis at each level, and the results are
similar across levels.  We report the results for the 2-digit level because at narrower definitions
of the industry, some firms in our sample become monopolies within their industries and23
therefore do not have separate industry returns.  For regressions that use percentage returns as the
measure of performance, qjt is the dollar-weighted average total return to shareholders for all
sample firms in the 2-digit SIC excluding firm j.  For regressions that use dollar returns as the
measure of performance, qjt is this average return multiplied by firm j's market value at the
beginning of year t.  This reflects the dollar returns that firm j's shareholders would have
received had the firm achieved the average industry percent return.
In order to test for relative performance evaluation, we would ideally like to have data on
the executive's entire portfolio of investments to determine whether her wealth is affected by the
performance of her industry.  Since we do not have such data, we cannot determine if relative
performance evaluation is present in the incentives generated by the executive's holdings of stock
or stock options in her own firm.  We are therefore able to test for relative performance
evaluation using only the three measures of flow compensation.
Table 6 presents median regressions using dollar returns as the measure of performance.
The top panel presents the coefficient estimates and their standard errors.  The bottom panel
presents the own and industry pay-performance sensitivities and the derivative of (a2/a1) with
respect to the stock beta.  Beneath each statistic is the p-value in brackets for the test of the
relevant null hypothesis.  Each statistic is evaluated at the median variance of the idiosyncratic
component of the own-firm performance (i.e., Gjt = 0.5) and at the expected value of bjt = 1.
In all specifications, the own-firm pay-performance sensitivity is positive and significant.
The own-firm pay-performance sensitivities are very close in magnitude to the corresponding
values in Table 3, which tested the principal-agent model.  For example, the value of 0.702 for
the flow compensation of CEOs is slightly lower than the value of 0.732 estimated in Table 3.
For flow compensation for both CEOs and other executives, the industry pay-performance
sensitivity is positive and insignificant.  For both the change and percent change in flow
compensation for both CEOs and other executives, the industry pay-performance sensitivities are
negative and generally significant.  These results provide mixed support for the relative
performance evaluation model.
The tests of the derivative of (a2/a1) with respect to the stock beta are presented in the
next row. For flow compensation for both CEOs and other executives, the derivative of (a2/a1)
with respect to the stock beta is negative.  For change in flow compensation and percent change
in flow compensation, the derivatives are positive for CEOs and negative for other executives.24
The p-values in the row labeled H1 show that in no case is the derivative significantly different
from zero.  These results provide no support for the relative performance evaluation model.
The second test based on the derivative, H2, uses the value of negative one predicted by
the relative performance evaluation model as the null hypothesis.  A low p-value for this test
would imply that the derivative is significantly different from negative one and would provide
evidence against the relative performance evaluation model.  In five of the specifications the p-
value is below 0.05, formally rejecting the relative performance evaluation model on the basis of
this test.
Table 7 presents median regressions using percent returns as the measure of performance.
The own-firm pay-performance sensitivities are positive and significant.  The industry pay-
performance sensitivities are positive and significant for flow compensation and generally
negative and insignificant for the other measures of compensation. The tests of the derivative of
(a2/a1) with respect to beta are unambiguous.  The point estimates are generally positive and
always insignificantly different from zero.  They are in all cases significantly different from
negative one. The median regressions in Tables 6 and 7 provide consistent evidence against the
relative performance evaluation model.
Table 8 contains the results using OLS and dollar returns as the measure of performance.
In all regressions, the own-firm pay-performance sensitivities are positive and close in
magnitude to the corresponding values in the top panel of Table 5, which tested the principal-
agent model. The own-firm pay-performance sensitivities are significant in only three of the six
specifications.  The industry pay-performance sensitivity is not significant in any specification,
and is positive for the dollar change in flow compensation and negative for the level and percent
change in flow compensation.
The tests of the derivative of (a2/a1) with respect to beta are presented in the next row.
In all cases, the point estimate of the derivative is positive, in contrast to the negative derivative
predicted by the theory.  In no case is the derivative significantly different from zero. These
results provide evidence against the relative performance evaluation model.  In only one case is
the derivative significantly different from negative one, although all of the p-values are below
0.2. The confidence intervals around the point estimates are sufficiently large to include both
zero and negative one.  Therefore, it is not possible to formally reject the relative performance
evaluation model on the basis of H2.25
The OLS results in Table 9 use percent returns as the measure of firm and industry
performance.  They similarly fail to support the relative performance evaluation model.  As in
Table 8, the own-firm pay-performance sensitivities are positive.  In these regressions, they are
statistically significant.  Each point estimate is somewhat larger than its counterpart in the
bottom panel of Table 5.  The estimates of the industry pay-performance sensitivity are negative
in all cases, but in no cases are the estimates statistically significant.  The point estimates for the
derivative of (a2/a1) with respect to beta are sometimes positive and sometimes negative but
never significantly different from zero.  In the cases of the percent change in flow compensation
to CEOs and the level of flow compensation to other executives, the derivatives are significantly
different from negative one.  The results using percent returns as the measure of performance do
not provide support for the relative performance evaluation model.
Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992) find comparable results in their analysis of
relative performance evaluation.  Specifically, in their strong form test of the relative
performance evaluation model (which corresponds to our H2), they find no evidence of complete
filtering of the industry component of firm performance.  They also examine whether the
industry pay-performance sensitivity is negative.  They find that it is positive and significant
when performance is measured using accounting returns and negative and significant when
performance is measured using stock returns.  In the latter case, the industry performance
variable adds little explanatory power to their compensation regressions.
The lack of evidence in support of the relative performance evaluation model has
remained a puzzle in the literature on executive compensation.  Although it may seem that our
strong evidence in favor of the principal-agent model would deepen the puzzle, there are reasons
why firms would optimally choose not to use relative performance evaluation to filter out
common components of shocks to performance.  While the use of relative performance
evaluation may improve the contract with respect to aspects of firm performance that the
executive cannot control (i.e., the common shock), it may worsen the contract with respect to
aspects of firm performance that the executive can control, such as pricing decisions.
In Aggarwal and Samwick (1997), we show that strategic interactions among firms in an
industry can explain the lack of relative performance evaluation in executive compensation.
When managers can be compensated based on their own and their industry performance, the
need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that26
places a positive weight on both own and industry profits.  The negative weight on industry
performance implied by the relative performance evaluation model would give the executive an
incentive to price too aggressively in the product market, thereby hurting firm profits.  We find
empirical support for this proposition by showing that executives in more competitive industries,
where the consequences of strategic interactions are most important, have compensation
contracts that place greater positive weights on industry performance relative to the weight on
own-firm performance.
V.  Conclusion
Much of the literature on executive compensation relies on the intuition of the principal-
agent model.  In particular, there is a presumption that managers will have large pay-
performance sensitivities to align their interests with those of their shareholders.  The empirical
literature has debated whether average pay-performance sensitivities are small (Jensen and
Murphy (1990a)) or large (Hall and Liebman (1997)).  We demonstrate that focusing on the
average level fails to appreciate the heterogeneity in pay-performance sensitivities.  This
heterogeneity can be used to explore the key cross-sectional prediction of the principal-agent
model: an executive's pay-performance sensitivity will be decreasing in the riskiness of the firm's
performance.
We test this prediction directly using a large sample of top executives at the biggest
publicly traded corporations in the United States.  We find that the pay-performance sensitivities
of both CEOs and other executives are decreasing in the variance of their firms' stock returns for
a variety of measures of compensation.  We show that the variance of a firm's stock returns is an
important variable in pay-performance regressions and that omitting it leads to downward biased
estimates of the pay-performance sensitivity.  In general, we find that executives in companies
with the lowest variance have pay-performance sensitivities that are an order of magnitude
greater than executives in companies with the highest variance.  We further show that pay-
performance sensitivities that do not condition on firm variance dramatically understate the true
pay-performance sensitivities that do condition on variance.
We also consider an extension of the principal-agent model to relative performance
evaluation.  The relative performance evaluation model has several testable predictions. First, the
industry pay-performance sensitivity is negative.  This prediction has been studied in several27
previous papers, with mixed results.  This debate is similar to the debate about the average size
of the own-firm pay-performance sensitivity in that it does not exploit the cross-sectional
predictions to test the model.  Second, the ratio of the industry pay-performance sensitivity to the
own-firm pay-performance sensitivity is decreasing in a firm's stock beta.  We find minimal
evidence that the industry pay-performance sensitivity is negative and no evidence that the ratio
of the industry pay-performance sensitivity to the own-firm pay-performance sensitivity is
decreasing in a firm's stock beta.  These results suggest that relative performance evaluation
considerations are not incorporated into executive compensation contracts. In Aggarwal and
Samwick (1997), we provide a theoretical explanation and a test for why it may not be optimal to
incorporate relative performance evaluation into compensation contracts due to strategic
interactions between managers at rival firms.  The relative performance evaluation results in this
paper and our earlier work are mutually consistent.
Our results support the principal-agent model of executive compensation. Previous
studies of the average level of the pay-performance sensitivity cannot determine whether
observed pay-performance sensitivities are optimal because such a conclusion depends critically
on unobserved parameters. Our comparative static approach suggests that principal-agent
considerations are incorporated into executive compensation contracts. Theoretical models based
on the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers have robust empirical
support and are an essential element of a complete theory of corporate governance.28
References
Aggarwal, Rajesh K., and Samwick, Andrew A. “Executive Compensation, Relative
Performance Evaluation, and Strategic Competition: Theory and Evidence.” Manuscript.
Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College, 1997.
Antle, Rick, and Smith, Abbie. “An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance
Evaluation of Corporate Executives.” Journal of Accounting Research 24 (Spring 1986): 1-39.
Barro, Jason R., and Barro, Robert J. “Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs.” Journal
of Labor Economics 8 (October 1990): 448-81.
Berle, Adolf, and Means, Gardiner. The Modern Corporation and Private Property.  New York:
Macmillan, 1932.
Buchinsky, Moshe. “Recent Advances in Quantile Regression Models: A Practical Guideline for
Empirical Research.” Journal of Human Resources 33 (Winter 1998): 88-126.
Garen, John. “Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory.” Journal of Political
Economy 102 (December 1994): 1175-99.
Gibbons, Robert, and Murphy, Kevin J. “Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive
Officers.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (February 1990): 30-S - 51-S.
Gould, W. W. “Quantile Regression with Bootstrapped Standard Errors.” Stata Technical
Bulletin 9 (1992): 19-21.
Hall, Brian, and Liebman, Jeffrey. “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?” Working Paper
no. 6213. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1997.
Haubrich, Joseph G. “Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem.”
Journal of Political Economy 102 (April 1994): 258-76.
Holmström, Bengt. “Moral Hazard and Observability.” Bell Journal of Economics 10 (Spring
1979): 74-91.
Holmström, Bengt. “Moral Hazard in Teams.” Bell Journal of Economics 13 (Summer 1982):
324-40.
Holmström, Bengt, and Milgrom, Paul. “Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of
Intertemporal Incentives.” Econometrica 55 (March 1987): 303-28.
Janakiraman, Surya; Lambert, Richard; and Larcker, David. “An Empirical Investigation of the
Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis.” Journal of Accounting Research 30 (Spring
1992): 53-69.29
Jensen, Michael, and Murphy, Kevin J. “Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives.”
Journal of Political Economy 98 (April 1990): 225-64. (a)
Jensen, Michael, and Murphy, Kevin J. “CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But
How.” Harvard Business Review 68 (May-June 1990): 138-53. (b)
Joh, Sung Wook. “Strategic Managerial Incentive Compensation in Japan: Relative Performance
Evaluation and Product Market Collusion.” Manuscript. Albany, NY: State University of New
York, May 1996.
Koenker, Roger, and Bassett, G. Jr. “Robust Tests for Heteroscedasticity Based on Regression
Quantiles.”  Econometrica 50 (January 1982): 43-61.
Lambert, Richard, and Larcker, David. “An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market
Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts.” Journal of Accounting
Research 25 (Supplement 1987): 85-125.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert. “A Survey of Corporate Governance.” Journal of Finance
52 (June 1997): 737-83.
Standard and Poor’s. S&P Compustat ExecuComp: The Executive Compensation Database.
Englewood, CO: McGraw-Hill, November 1995.30
Table 1a
Measures of Executive Compensation, 1995
Chief Executive Officers Other Executives








































1) All dollar amounts are in thousands of 1995 dollars.
2) The number of observations used for each sample and compensation measure is reported in brackets beneath the
mean amount of compensation.
Table 1b
Ownership of Stock and Stock Options, 1995
Chief Executive Officers Other Executives
Percent Conditional Percent Conditional
who Own Mean Median Maximum Who Own Mean Median Maximum
Wealth in
Firm Stock
97.96% 65,361 4,641 16,600,000 93.61% 8,066 648 2,707,011
Share of
Firm Owned
2.98% 0.31% 63.23% 0.44% 0.05% 43.38%
Options on
Firm Stock




68.87% 1,234 510 41,011 72.41% 393 166 22,861
Notes:
1) All dollar amounts are in thousands of 1995 dollars.
2) Current option grants are valued according to the Black-Scholes formula, as described in Standard and Poor's
(1995).31
Table 1c













Annual Returns Monthly Returns
0 -97.38% -$18,755 2.73 0.52 -0.660
10 -25.55 -265 4.99 3.81 0.483
20 -12.67 -87 5.83 4.68 0.643
30 -4.63 -25 6.52 5.31 0.764
40 2.53 15 7.31 6.03 0.862
50 9.91 61 8.07 6.76 0.965
60 17.26 124 9.01 7.65 1.058
70 26.10 242 10.06 8.70 1.158
80 37.42 515 11.54 10.11 1.287
90 57.33 1,311 13.77 12.27 1.526
100 475.71 60,990 32.06 31.54 3.360
Mean 14.72 483 8.82 7.52 0.989
Source S & P ExecuComp CRSP
Notes:
1) Dollar returns are reported in millions of constant 1995 dollars.
2) Standard deviations and betas of returns are calculated over the five years preceding the year in which the firm
is observed in the ExecuComp sample.32
Table 2
Median Regression Estimates of Pay-Performance Sensitivities for Measures of Firm-Specific Wealth, 1993 - 1996
Chief Executive Officers Other Executives
Change in Wealth
Excluding




Coefficients from Median Regressions








g2  Performance *








































Coefficients from Median Regressions








g2  Performance *







































Observations 4507 4586 14594 14888
Notes:
1) Each regression includes year effects.
2) Bootstrapped standard errors based on 20 replications are in parentheses below each estimate.
3) Compensation is measured in thousands and dollar returns are measured in millions of 1995 dollars.  Percent
returns are measured in percentage points.
4) The pay-performance sensitivity is a1 = g1 + F(s
2)*g2.33
Table 3
Median Regression Estimates of Pay-Performance Sensitivities for Measures of Flow Compensation, 1993 - 1996














Coefficients from Median Regressions












g2  Performance *
























































Coefficients from Median Regressions












g2  Performance *























































Observations 4982 4496 4490 21428 16419 16414
Notes:
1) Each regression includes year effects.
2) Bootstrapped standard errors based on 20 replications are in parentheses below each estimate.
3) Compensation is measured in thousands and dollar returns are measured in millions of 1995 dollars.  Percent
returns are measured in percentage points.
4) The pay-performance sensitivity is a1 = g1 + F(s
2)*g2.34
Table 4
OLS Estimates of Pay-Performance Sensitivities for Measures of Firm-Specific Wealth, 1993 - 1996
Chief Executive Officers Other Executives
Change in Wealth
Excluding




Coefficients from OLS Regressions








g2  Performance *








































Coefficients from OLS Regressions








g2  Performance *







































Observations 4507 4586 14594 14888
Notes:
1) Each regression includes year effects and executive fixed effects.
2) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses below each estimate.  For regressions on the sample
of other executives, the standard errors are robust to correlation among executives at the same firm in each year.
3) Compensation is measured in thousands and dollar returns are measured in millions of 1995 dollars.  Percent
returns are measured in percentage points.
4) The pay-performance sensitivity is a1 = g1 + F(s
2)*g2.35
Table 5
OLS Estimates of Pay-Performance Sensitivities for Measures of Flow Compensation, 1993 - 1996














Coefficients from OLS Regressions












g2  Performance *
























































Coefficients from OLS Regressions












g2  Performance *























































Observations 4982 4496 4490 21428 16419 16414
Notes:
1) Each regression includes year effects and executive fixed effects.
2) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses below each estimate.  For regressions on the sample
of other executives, the standard errors are robust to correlation among executives at the same firm in each year.
3) Compensation is measured in thousands and dollar returns are measured in millions of 1995 dollars.  Percent
returns are measured in percentage points.
4) The pay-performance sensitivity is a1 = g1 + F(s
2)*g2.36
Table 6
Tests of Relative Performance Evaluation at the 2-digit SIC Level, Dollar Returns, Median Regressions, 1993 - 1996























































d4 Industry Perf. *













d5 Industry Perf. *













d6 Industry Perf. *

















































Comparative Statics and P-values [in brackets]
a1  Own Firm




























  H1: Zero



















Observations 4620 4172 4166 19868 15291 15286
Notes:
1) Each regression includes year effects.
2) Bootstrapped standard errors based on 20 replications are in parentheses below each estimate.
3) Compensation is measured in thousands and dollar returns are measured in millions of 1995 dollars.
4) The pay-performance sensitivities are a1 = d1 + 0.5*d2 and a2 = d3 + 0.5*d4 + 1*d5 + 0.5*1*d6.37
Table 7
Tests of Relative Performance Evaluation at the 2-digit SIC Level, Percent Returns, Median Regressions, 1993 - 96























































d4 Industry Perf. *













d5 Industry Perf. *













d6 Industry Perf. *

















































Comparative Statics and P-values [in brackets]
a1  Own Firm




























  H1: Zero



















Observations 4620 4172 4166 19868 15291 15286
Notes:
1) Each regression includes year effects.
2) Bootstrapped standard errors based on 20 replications are in parentheses below each estimate.
3) Compensation is measured in thousands of 1995 dollars.  Percent returns are measured in percentage points.
4) The pay-performance sensitivities are a1 = d1 + 0.5*d2 and a2 = d3 + 0.5*d4 + 1*d5 + 0.5*1*d6.38
Table 8
Tests of Relative Performance Evaluation at the 2-digit SIC Level, Dollar Returns, OLS Regressions, 1993 - 1996























































d4 Industry Perf. *













d5 Industry Perf. *













d6 Industry Perf. *

















































Comparative Statics and P-values [in brackets]
a1  Own Firm




























  H1: Zero



















Observations 4620 4172 4166 19868 15291 15286
Notes:
1) Each regression includes year effects and executive fixed effects.
2) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses below coefficients.  For regressions on the sample
of other executives, the standard errors are robust to correlation among executives at the same firm in each year.
3) Compensation is measured in thousands and dollar returns are measured in millions of 1995 dollars.
4) The pay-performance sensitivities are a1 = d1 + 0.5*d2 and a2 = d3 + 0.5*d4 + 1*d5 + 0.5*1*d6.39
Table 9
Tests of Relative Performance Evaluation at the 2-digit SIC Level, Percent Returns, OLS Regressions, 1993 - 1996























































d4 Industry Perf. *













d5 Industry Perf. *













d6 Industry Perf. *

















































Comparative Statics and P-values [in brackets]
a1  Own Firm




























  H1: Zero



















Observations 4620 4172 4166 19868 15291 15286
Notes:
1) Each regression includes year effects and executive fixed effects.
2) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses below each estimate.  For regressions on the sample
of other executives, the standard errors are robust to correlation among executives at the same firm in each year.
3) Compensation is measured in thousands of 1995 dollars.  Percent returns are measured in percentage points.
4) The pay-performance sensitivities are a1 = d1 + 0.5*d2 and a2 = d3 + 0.5*d4 + 1*d5 + 0.5*1*d6.